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I. IntroductionThe Behavior of the Chinese State Enterprises under the
Dual Influence of the Government and the Market





The paper examines the behavior of the Chinese state owned enterprises after
the reform. The focus is on the key issue of government-enterprise interaction.
Based on theoretical analyses and empirical tests, I argue that despite facing strong
profit incentives, many of the Chinese state-owned enterprises are still greatly
influenced by the government and dependent on the government. They behave like
rent-seekers when negotiating contracts with the government. At the same time,
the government takes the opportunity to impose its objective onto the enterprise.
After signing the contract, firms maximize market profit in making short-term
production decisions. However, when it comes to final profit, they are virtually
not accountable for financial losses. The implication is that the Chinese enterprise
reform provides incentives for firms to pursue short-term efficiency, while long-term
dynamic efficiency may not as high.
Keywords: enterprise reform, dual-track pricing/contract system, rent-seeking, soft
budget constraint, the Chinese economy.
JEL Classification Code: P50, P52, D21.
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The paper studies the behavior of the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE's), which
are the central target of China's gradualist reform. My approach is to focus on the
crucial issue of the government-enterprise interaction after the reform. The general
conclusion is that although the reform has provided the Chinese SOE's with strong profit
incentives after mid-1980's, many enterprises are still both influenced by the government
and dependent on the government for various kinds of favors. The conclusion points out
the need to further complete the reform, as many have argued (Kornai, 1980; Kornai,
1992; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), the government/enterprise relation is the most
fundamental cause of all problems of the former socialist system and a successful reform
has to properly redefine such a relation.
The Chinese enterprise reform, which has aroused keen interest in recent years, is in
essence a slow and incomplete process of disentangling the government/enterprise rela-
tion. Avoiding outright privatization, the reform espouses two themes: decentralization
and marketization. Decentralization means more autonomy and more profit incentives
for the enterprise. Marketization calls for the utilization of the market mechanism and
the product market competition as means of corporate governance. Reform measures
built around the two themes do not completely replace the existing system, instead they
allow the new system to "grow out or the old one (Naughton, 1993).
The unique and well-known dual-track price system exemplifies the gradual nature of
the Chinese enterprise reform. On surface, the dual-track system allows the co-existence
of the planned prices and the market ones. In essence, it is a system which maintains
much of the control rights of the government bureaucrats over the enterprises in face of
market mechanism (in the way theorized by Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and
Moore, 1990). In the dual track system, each SOE is entitled to an input quota, up to
which input can be purchased at the (usually lower) planned price. At the same time,
the SOE has to deliver to the government an output quota at the (usually lower) planned
price. Beyond the quota, the SOE's buy and sell in the market. The negotiation for the
quota contract is a rent-seeking process on the part of the enterprise and, at the same
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time, a chance for the bureaucrats to exercise their control rights over the enterprise.
In order to characterize the enterprise behavior in light of the enterprise-government
interaction, I model a full operation cycle of the Chinese SOE. At the beginning of
the operation cycle, the manager and the government bureaucrat negotiate a contract
on the input/output quotas as well as profit sharing rules. Afterwards, the firm starts
production by making its input/output decision. At the end of the operation cycle,
when the profit is realized, the manager and bureaucrat may well bargain again on the
distribution of profit. The focus of my analysis is on the quota negotiation at the first
stage of the operation cycle.
The conclusions of the analyses show different aspects of the behavior of the Chinese
state enterprises after the reform, that is, the so-called dual-dependence of the enterprise
on the government and the on the market. When negotiating a contract with the gov-
ernment, the SOE managers behave like rent-seekers, since a large amount of profit is at
stake in this process. The dual-track pricing system sets The stage for such kind of rent-
seeking activities. Through the bargaining process, the government partially imposes its
objective onto the enterprise (in a way similar to that in Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny,
1993). After the negotiation of the contract, the enterprise faces the market and tries
to maximize its market profit by choosing the best input/output combination. Finally,
when the realized profit is negative, the enterprise fully relies upon the government to
cover the loss. Thus, the so-called soft budget constraint is still prevalent among Chinese
SOE's.
The conclusions of the paper imply an evaluation of the Chinese state enterprises.
On the one hand, the reform is credited for providing strong profit incentives and au-
tonomy for the enterprise. With such strong profit incentives, the firms tend to make
various market-oriented decisions to improve efficiency. On the other hand, given heavy
interactions between the government and the enterprise in the form of rent-seeking and
soft budget constraint, dynamic efficiency of the Chinese SOE's may not be as high as
commonly believed.
There are numerous good studies on the Chinese enterprise reform.
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Many authors
have carefully measured the productivity and efficiency of these firms after the reform
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For a survey of the these studies, see Jefferson and Rawski (1994).
and reached the conclusion that productivity of the firms has increased significantly after
the reform. Some of these studies are Chen, Wang, Zheng, Jefferson and Rawski (1988);
Gordon and Li (1991); Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992); Groves, Hong, McMillian
and Naughton (1993). Consistent with these findings, Groves, Hong, McMillian and
Naughton (1994) and Jefferson and Xu (1993) are excellent studies that carefully ex-
amine the enterprise's positive response to the reform measures, such as the increase in
enterprise autonomy. However, several authors have voiced their concern about draw-
backs of the enterprise reform. For example, Fan and Woo (1992) and Woo, Hai, Jin
and Fan (1993) argue that the SOE's are still very inefficient and represent a big desta-
bilizing force in the Chinese economy. Given the complicated nature of the issue, all of
these studies and mine are necessary to understand the different aspects of the-Chinese
state enterprise reform.
In the following section, section II, I will develop a theoretical framework to study the
interactions between the Chinese government and SOE's. Section III empirically tests
the theoretical arguments made in the previous section. Finally, section IV concludes
the paper.
II. A Theoretical Analysis
I will model a full operation cycle of a Chinese firm. The cycle contains three time
periods. Period 1 is planning and bargaining between the firm and the government.
Period 2 is production and period 3 is distribution of profit. The single output is y and
the single intermediate input is x. In periods 1 and 2, the government and the firm have
extensive interactions.
In period 1, the firm and the government bargain about the quota. Let qo and yo
be the planned price and the quota of the firm's output y, respectively. Let po and xo
be those of the input x. 9h and po are exogenous to the model, since in reality they
are historically determined by the pre-reform central planning system. The production
function is assumed to be
y=f(z).
f(.) is assumed to follow standard properties of production function: f'(.) > 0 and
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f"(.) < 0. Note that capital and labor are not directly included in such a production
function, since they are assumed to be fixed in the short-run which is the time-horizon
of the model.
As a notational convention, assume that the allocation of quota (xo, yo) is balanced,
that is, xo is just sufficient to produce yo, or:
yo=f(zo).
Once allowing for budgetary transfers, such a convention is not as restrictive as it
appears at a first glimpse, since with a market for input x, a quota xo+Ax with Ax > 0
(Ax < 0) means that the firm gets a subsidy (is levied a lump sum tax) equivalent to
(p - po)Ax. The contractual variables xo, yo are subject to bargaining between the firm
and the government. Let q and p be the market prices of y and x, respectively. Thus,
the profit earned from the quota at the market price is:
qyo - pxo
and the profit earned at the planned price is:
9oyo - Poxo-
Thus, by obtaining the quota (xo, yo) from the government instead of trading in the
market, the firm earns a rent R:
R(xo) = (gouo - poxo) - (qyo - pxo).
Of course, the rent can be either positive or negative, depending on the price differences.
The value of R is subject to bargaining. The bargaining over the quota x0 and yo is in
essence the bargaining over the rent R.
In period 2, the firm produces by choosing its input-output combination. At the end
of period 2, the profit is determined. It consists of a deterministic component 110 and a
random noise e from the production and marketing process. lro is the expected profit of
the firm. When the firm operates beyond the quota, i.e., y yo and x xo, 1o is:
1o =q[f(x) -yo]-p(x-xo)+oyo-poxo
On the other hand, when the firm chooses to operate by the quota, i.e., y = yo and
x = xo, no becomes ifo = 9o09 - poxo
-y-px+ (p-po)xo-(q-o)uo.
In general, we can define the expected market profit as
= qf(x)-pi.
Therefore, the total expected profit at the beginning of period 2 can be re-written as:
iro(x,xo) = rm.(x) + R(xo), s.t. y yo, x >xo.
The actual realized profit of the firm 7r is subject to many random factors, such as market
fluctuations, production interruptions, and quality shocks, etc. As a simple assumption,
let the final profit be:
S= 7
1o'+e = m+ R +e.
e is assumed to have mean 0 and follow distribution f,(.) with cumulated distribution
function F,(.).
Period 3 is distribution. If the realized profit it is positive, then the firm and the
government divides the total profit according to a profit tax rate.3 Assuming that the
profit tax rate is 1 - Q, then the firm gets a retained profit of:
r = /?Oro + e),
when iro+e > 0. However, if the profit is negative, then another round of negotiation will
arise. Since in reality, bankruptcy is non-existent, the firm and the government negotiate
on how much subsidies the firm will get, or, how much loss should be sustained by the
firm. Without getting into the details of the bargaining process, I assume that in this
case, the firm sustains a loss of
rR= 'y(ifo + C).
'Actually, # is also subject to bargaining in period 1. Here, in order to simplify the model, this
problem is ignored. So long as the division rule of profit is not changed when the profit Is positive, all
the conclusions remain to be valid.
= qf(x) - px + (p - po)xo - (q -gqo)yo.
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In other words, the subsidies to the firm is (1 - 7)( ro + e). Due to the problem of soft
budget constraint, assume that Y </#.
The objective function of the firm is to maximize the retained profit 7r5, which is
closely linked to bonuses and welfare spending of the the firm. Findings of many studies
(such as Jefferson and Xu, 1991; Groves, Hong, McMillian and Naughton,1994) lend
support to such an objective function of the enterprise. In the following, I identify the
firm with the manager, since in a model of short horizon, job security of managers is not
an issue.
The government's objective consists of two goals. On the one hand, the government
treasures the revenue obtained from the firm's profit, since the economic and political
power of the government is dependent upon this. On the other hand, the government,
which is controlled by professional career bureaucrats, likes to see a large output and
employment from the enterprise. A high output y benefits the bureaucrat in at least two
ways. A large output represents the a large domain of control right of the bureaucrat.
Also, a large output is associated with high employment which reduces various social
problem. The desire for output, as argued by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), is
a coherent feature of the politics of the old socialist system. As a matter of fact, the
output index is one of the most important figures in the Chinese industrial statistics and
the performance of the bureaucrats is judged by it. Thus, the government's final payoff
is a convex combination of the two components:
AE(ire) + (1 - A)y'
where 7ro is the net revenue of the government from the firm.
To model the bargaining game between the firm and the government, I will assume
that relative bargaining power of the firm is a. a can be regarded as a simple index
of the effort or finesse of the firm in negotiating with the government. A simple Nash
bargaining solution is adopted, in order not to be concerned with detailed procedural
considerations.
Next in this section, I will first characterize the behavior of the firm in the second
period, then examine the bargaining in the first period. Finally, I will discuss further
issues and the implications of the analytical results for the efficiency of the reform.
II.1 The Production Decision
In the second period, the quota parameters Yo and xo have already been decided and
the firm makes a decision on the input-output combination (x, y). Anticipating different
rules of dividing profits when profits are positive or negative, the manager calculates the
expected retained profit:
E(lrR) = E[#(iro + e)I e> -ro][1 - F,(-ro)]J+ E['y(ro + e)I e < -roJF,(-ro).
Recall that the expected total profit:
7ro = irm(x) + R(xo) = qf(x) - px + R(xo).
Therefore, the firm's problem is:
Max{z} E[/(Nro + e) I e> -ro][1 - F,(-iro)]J+ E[7(lro + e) I E< -7ro]F,(-ro);
s.t. ro = qf(x) - pxz+ R(xo);
z > X0 .
The choice of x only affects the expected total profit from the market irm. The
manager unambiguously prefers a higher fm to a lower one, since a higher irm gives a
higher probability that the firm is not in red and in that case, the firm can expect to
have a higher retained profit. Therefore, intuitively, it is clear that the firm's choice of x
is to maximize 7rm, the profit evaluated at the market price. The following proposition
summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1 Let (1, y) be the finn's choice of input-output combination and (xi, yi)
be the input-output that maximizes the market profit ,m = qy - px. Then (a, y) =
(Max{xi, xo}, Max{yi, yo}). In other words, despite the problem of the soft budget
constraint, the firm's production decision is efficient, subject to quota constraints.
Proof: See Appendix Al.
This result should be carefully interpreted. First, it gives an impression that the soft
budget constraint does not have bad consequences. This is because the framework is
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only concerned with static input/output decisions and leaves out the issue of investment
decision, which is distorted in the presence of the soft budget constraint. Second, the
proposition appears to imply that quota allocations can be harmless. Such a conclusion
was the very justification for the quota system. As I will argue later, this is not entirely
the case, since ex ante a large amount resources is devoted in bargaining on quotas.
Thus, the quota system is in the way of enhancing long-term efficiency.
One implication of the proposition is that after the reform the Chinese firm's short-
term productivity should be improved due to more efficient production decision. Indeed,
this is a common conclusion of many studies, such as Chen, Wang, Zheng, Jefferson,
and Rawski (1988), Gordon and Li (1991), and Jefferson and Xu (1991).
Li (1993) offers an empirical test of the efficiency of the input-output choice predicted
by proposition 1. The test result is very close to that of similar tests conducted on the
U.S. firms. Under the null hypothesis that firms do maximize profit when choosing
input-output combination, the test statistic is x2(82) = 121.26 with the critical value
x2oo.(82) = 117.8. Appelbaum (1978) is a test with the U.S. data, and the result is
2 = 19.7 v.s. a critical value of 15.1 at 1%. Thus, one may conclude that like the U.S.
firms, the Chinese firm's input-output choice is rather close to profit maximization.
11.2. The Bargaining of Quotas
To simplify the analysis and to focus on the enterprise behavior, I assume that
there is no real price distortion in the old planning system. All the difference between
the market price and the planned price is due to inflationary pressure. Most of the
conclusions and intuitions derived from such a simplifying assumption still hold in a
more general framework. To be precise, assume:
qo=kq, po=kp, 0<k<1.
With this assumption, the rent R associated with quota zo becomes:
R(xo) = (k - 1)[qf(xo) - pxo] = (k - 1)irm(xo)
and the firm's total profit becomes
r= 7ro+e= 7rm(x)+(k-1)rm(zo)+e.
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From 7r, the firm gets the retained profit iR and the government gets revenue nr ac-
cording to rules described before.
The firm maximizes its objective function F(.) which is the expected retained profit:
F(xo) = E(W[zo, x(zo)]}.
The government's objective function is
G = AE(ro) + (1- A)y.
Suppose that the pre-reform production plan is (x*, y*). This is the default production
plan if no agreement can be reached in the negotiation for quotas. The justification for
this assumption is that the reform is not a compulsory process, both party have to agree
to departing from the original plan in order for the reform to proceed.
Two extreme situations are discussed in the following. In the first case, the gov-
ernment can make lump sum budgetary transfers to the firm as part of a package in
negotiating on quotas. For example, the government can reach an agreement with the
firm so that the firm has to produce yo output and the government subsidizes (or taxes)
the firm an amount oft. In the second case, the government faces a tight budget so that
such kind of ex ante lump sum transfers are impossible. The reality should lie in the
middle of the two extreme cases and the real quota allocations should be in between the
two extreme predictions.
The generalized Nash bargaining solution is given by
MAX (F - F*)'(G -G*)(-a
where, 0 < 6 < 1 is the relative bargaining power of the firm; F* and G* are the status
quo payoff of the firm and the government, respectively.
Case 1. Ex Ante Budgetary Transfer Is Possible
Let t be the ex ante (up front) budgetary transfer from the government to the firm.
Exactly through which way t is implemented is not a concern here. It can take many
forms. A popular form is through providing extra (relative to output quota) input quota
at the low planned price. Another form is by promising favorable treatment in taxes.
Therefore, the following analysis is to predict the output quota f(xo) (which is defined
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as the corresponding level of input to produce the output quota), instead of the input
quota which may not be xo. (when t is made through adjusting the input quota)
With the transfer, the payoff to the firm becomes:
F= E(lrR)+t
where the retained profit lrn depends on both x and xo. The payoff to the government
becomes:
G(xo, t) = A[E(ir) - t]+ (1 - A)f[x(xo)].
The Nash Bargaining solution is given by:
MAX(,,) [ E[ir (x, xo)] + t - F* ]'[ A[ E[lrG(x, xo)] - t]+ (1 - A)f[x(xo)] - G '
8.t. x = argmax,>,, E[wr(x, xo)];
E[7r(x, xo)]= E[#(iro + e)I e> -iro][1 - F,(-ro)]J+ E[-y(iro + e)I e < -aro]F,(-ro);
E[irc(x, xo)] = E[(1-3)(iro+e) |Ie> -2ro][1-F,(-ro)]+E[(1-)(ro+e) I e < -iro]F,(-ro).
The constraints state that the final production x is endogenous and depends on the
quota xo. The following proposition predicts the level of output quota.
Proposition 2 When the government can arrange unrestricted ex ante lump sum bud-
getary transfers to the firm, the equilibrium output quota f(xo) is either 0 or f[x2(k, A))
with x2 > X; where x maximizes total expected market profit E(irm). Moreover, the
equilibrium f (xo) is non-increasing in A and x2 is non-increasing in k.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
The results are intuitive. A low A means that the government tends to care more
about output than controlling output. Thus, the outcome is high quota such that the
firm's output can be higher. On the other hand, the intuition for the 8g< 0 is slightly
more complicated. The quota, x2, exists in order to coordinate the difference between
the objectives of the firm and the government: the firms loves profit and the government
loves output more. Fixing a quota, such a divergence is augmented by the difference
between the planned price and the market price. Thus, when k increases, the quota x2
is smaller.
A feature of proposition 1 is that the allocation of quota is independent of the relative
bargaining power. The intuition is very simple: when transfers are possible and when
the firm cares about profit, adjusting the transfer t is more efficient than bargaining over
zo-
One special case of the proposition deserves special attention. It explains one kind of
soft budget constraint, which I shall define as ex ante soft budget constraint. Consider
a situation in which A is small enough so that f(zo) = f(z 2) > f(x). This is the
case when the government desires a tight control over the output. In this case, the firm
over-produces relative to the profit maximizing level. The over-production can go so far
that the expected profit is negative, that is,
iro(z 2) = x.(z2) + (k - 1)r,.(x2) = krm(x2) < 0.
Thus, the firm operates inefficiently and expects to lose profit. Also the firm gets a
subsidy of t. This gives an appearance that the firm does not care about profit and
still obtains subsidies. The model says that this is a natural outcome of the bargaining
game in which the government has an excessive desire for the control of output. Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny(1993) uses this theory to explain the soft budget constraint. Here I
define this as ex ante soft budget constraint, since there is another kind of soft budget
constraint when the firm makes loss unexpectedly and I will define that as the ex post
soft budget constraint. The following corollary sums up the discussion.
Corollary 1 (Ex ante Soft Budget Constraint - Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) )
There exists A > 0, such that when A < A, the total expected profit is negative, that is,
E(7r) < 0.
In addition, t > 0.
Proof: (Trivial; Omitted.)
Case 2. Ex Ante Budgetary Tansfer Is Impossible
This is the opposite of case 1. Now, the government faces a tight budget which does
not allow any transfers. Without t, the Nash solution becomes:
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MAX(,) [ E[rR(x, xo)] - F* ]'[ AE[rG(x, zo)] + (1 - A)f![x(xo)] - G* '-;
s.t. x = argmaxt>:o E[irn(x, xo)];
E[R(x, xo)]= E[f(7ro + e) I E > -ro][1 - F,(-ro)]+ E[y(wo + e)|l e < -iro]F,(-iro);
E[lrG(x, xo)] = E[(1-#)(ro+e)| e > -7 o][1-F,(-so)]+E[(1-7)(ro+e)| e -ro]F,(-ro).
Here the quota allocation xo plays the role of adjusting the payoffs of both parties so
that what each gets depends on its relative bargaining power. Unlike the previous case,
the equilibrium xo can take many values.
Proposition 3 Without budgetary transfers, the equilibrium allocation xo E [0,X3 ,
where z3 (p, q, A, k) is at least as large as x2(p, q, A, k) of proposition 2. Rtrthermore,
2 <0; 0; i$O0; &i ;>0. Finally, the sign of Q can go either way.
Proof: See Appendix A3.
The basic message of proposition 2 is the same as that of proposition 1. This is, a
major factor affecting the level of quota is government's preference between revenue and
output. When the government cares more about output, quota level tends to be higher.
An easy to understand conclusion is that the power of the firm, 6, affects the quota level
negatively, since the firm prefers a low quota and the government in general likes a high
quota. Also, the initial position before the bargaining is important. An initially well
situated party should do well in the bargaining. The empirical tests in the next section
will verify these predictions.
11.4. Further Discussions of the Model
The theoretical framework can be readily extended to discuss two other important
aspects of the firm behavior. The implications from such extensions are interesting.
The first issue is the investment decision or the demand for investment of the firm. The
second is rent seeking.
Investment decision of the firm is absent in the model. Therefore, the presence of
the soft budget constraint does not cause any inefficiency. However, with investment
considerations, such an efficiency outcome will disappear. As a matter of fact, the soft
budget constraint is in essence an ex ante subsidy for investor and thus causes excessive
demand for investment (Kornai, 1992; Li, 1993). In other words, firms' investment
decisions, which are unlike static input/output decisions and has long-term consequences,
are socially inefficient. Facing such a high demand for investment, the government is
unlikely to allocate investment fund efficiently. This gives rise to one kind of dynamic
inefficiencies across firms, since truly efficient firms may not get the needed capital.
Another implication of the model is that rent seeking can be very crucial to the
firm. This may be a severe impediment to efficiency improvement in the firm. In a
more general framework, assume that the production function is y = Af(x), where A
is an endogenous productivity factor. Suppose that in period 1, the manager dloes two
things at the same time: studying the market and spending time and energy bargaining
with the government. Suppose that the manager spends em of his time studying the
market and 1 - em dealing with the government. em is expended in order to increase
the productivity of the firm, i.e., A = A(em). 1 - em is spent to increase the bargaining
power of the firm: a = a(1 - em). As Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) has argued,
rent seeking has a scale economy, while improving productive efficiency does not. Thus,
it can be shown in the generalized model that in equilibrium, managers will spend a lot
of time dealing with the bureaucrats instead of within the firm or in the market place.
The end result is that the equilibrium productivity level A is low. Clearly, this is a
rather socially undesirable situation.
To summarize, investment hunger with misallocation of capital and excessive rent
seeking are implied by the model as two undesirable aspects of the Chinese enterprise
reform. These are problems that can prevent the Chinese state enterprises from making
effective long-run decisions, despite the fact that their short-run production decisions
can be efficient as shown before. Therefore, the implication is that in the long run,
there may be limits to the positive effects of the Chinese enterprise reform, although the




In the following empirical analyses, I will concentrate on the interaction between the
government and the SOE, i.e., the negotiation of the quota and the bargaining for the
soft budget constraint. I will examine the pattern of the allocation of quota and the
impact of quota negotiation on the profit of the enterprise. Also, the magnitude of the
soft budget constraint is estimated.
III.1. The Data
The data is from a so-called Enterprise Panel Survey (EPS) project, which aimed to
evaluate the performance of China's enterprises, and hence that of the reform. The EPS
was initiated in 1985 by the Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (CES-
RRI) in conjunction with some other economic research institutions in China. About
800 industrial enterprises were chosen and quarterly data was collected from each of the
enterprises starting from the first quarter of 1986. The data available for the present
research is limited to the first ten (10) quarters, namely, the first quarter of 1986 to
the second quarter of 1988.4 Only about 600 firms had their data recorded for all 10
quarters.
The sample selection of the original data set is not uniform. The majority of the
firms included are large and medium state owned enterprises. In addition, the lack
of a uniform reporting standard for some of the entries is very common. A prudent
methodology is adopted in this research; that is, whenever unexplained violations of
accounting identities occur, then firm's record is deleted. It is likely that the mistakes
in reporting on the part of the enterprises are random, since most of them are purely
arithmetical and do not seem to be intentionally manipulated. In the end, out of the
800 firm, about 500 are utilized for the statistical analyses in the following empirical
analyses.
The dataset essentially covers three aspects of the firms' economic statistics. It has
physical quantities of input/output for major (3 of them) products; various accounting
4The CESRRI was blamed for its involvement in the Tienanmen event in June 1989 and was subse-
quently dissolved. However, the EPS project survived.
Table 1: Distribution of Quota by the Type of Control
Year Controlled by Mean St. Dev.
Central Government 0.783 0.366
1986 Provincial Government 0.632 0.427
Prefectural Government 0.462 0.427
County Government 0.456 0.509
Year Controlled by Mean St. Dev.
Central Government 0.770 0.377
1987 Provincial Government 0.600 0.416
Prefectural Government 0.442 0.430
County Government 0.461 0.512
Year Controlled by Mean St. Dev.
Central Government 0.767 0.366
1988 Provincial Government 0.579 0.426
Prefectural Government 0.417 0.428
County Government 0.298 0.465
figures, including sales revenue, costs and different kinds of profit;
different kinds of investment of the firm.
asset values and
111.2 The Negotiation of Quotas
I will study two respects of the negotiation on quota in this sub-section, namely, the
determination of quota and the effect of quota negotiation on the profit of the firm. As
a first look, Table 1 to Table 3 give some descriptive statistics on the distribution of
output quotas for various classifications of firms.
It is easy to discern some patterns of the quota allocation. Across the years, output
quotas decreased. Firms controlled by higher branches of government tend to get higher
quotas. Larger firms get higher quotas. Finally, Mining and raw material industry gets
the highest quota while heavy manufacturing gets the lowest.
In order to analyze the allocation of quota on a more rigorous basis, a group of
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Table 2: Distribution of Quota by Size
Year Size Mean St. Dev.
Large 0.605 0.411
1986 Medium 0.495 0.441
Small 0.454 0.447
Large 0.600 0.408
1987 Medium 0.474 0.442
Small 0.433 0.439
Large 0.574 0.418
1988 Medium 0.438 0.440
Small 0.404 0.435
censored regressions are carried out. The dependent variable Q is the output quota ratio
(quota to total output) which lies between 0 and 1. In the dataset, there are sample dense
points of value 0's and 1's for Q, since some firms either have no output quota or fully
rely on the government for selling the output. Therefore, Q can be regarded as a censored
dependent variable. Table 4 and 5 contain the regression results. Three regressions are
carried out. Regression 1 includes the most complete set of regressors, while regression
2 and 3 drop many of the insignificant variable for the sake of multicollinearity. (there
are strong correlations among types of firms)
The dummy variables are as following. Relation dummies, Gov1, Gov2, Gov3, in-
dicate the control relationship of the firm - whether it is controlled by the central
government, the provincial government, the prefecture government, respectively. (gov-
ernments of lower levels are the default case). The trade dummies indicate: the mining
and raw material processing industry (TRD1); light manufacturing industries (TRD2);
chemical industries (TRD3); and heavy manufacturing industries. Large, medium and
small firms are dummied respectively by SC1, SC2 and SC3. Unfortunately, in a lot
of situations, these dummies are perfectly co-linear with other ones, especially the re-
lationship dummies." The enterprise responsibility system is dummied by Ref1, which
means the firm signs a contract with the government; the director tenure target system
is dummied by Ref2. The director tenure system is manager-specific and is generally
loaded with higher incentive programs than the enterprise responsibility system.
The regression results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions in the
last section. A few findings are worthwhile discussing.
" The Market/Plan Price Ratio (P-ratio) The P-ratio commands an insignificant
and small coefficient. This is not surprising at all, as the predictions on this from
the two cases discussed in the theoretical part indicate certain ambiguity.
" The Control Effect (who controls the firm) Estimates on dummies Gov1 to Gov3
show that firms controlled by higher level governments have higher output quotas.
This is consistent with the prediction. It is widely observed that relatively higher
'This means that adding in these additional dummies will not give additional explanatory power to
the system. For instance, a firm with Gov1=1 almost guarantees that either SC1=1 or SC2=1, vice
versa.
Table 3: Distribution Output Quota by Industry
Year Industry Mean St. Dev.
Mining & Raw Material 0.752 0.382
1986 Light Manufacturing 0.578 0.452
Chemical Industry 0.565 0.408
Heavy Manufacturing 0.434 0.422
Mining & Raw Material 0.729 0.387
1987 Light Manufacturing 0.560 0.450
Chemical Industry 0.587 0.414
Heavy Manufacturing 0.402 0.410
Mining & Raw Material 0.726 0.401
1988 Light Manufacturing 0.526 0.456
Chemical Industry 0.546 0.416
Heavy Manufacturing 0.383 0.411
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Table 4: Censored Regression Analysis of Output Quota Table 5: Censored Regression Analysis of Output Quota
Regression 1 Regression 2
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio Prob(t > x) Coefficient t-ratio Prob(t > x)
One -0.379 -1.313 0.189 -0.223 -2.652 0.008
Year86 0.166 2.499 0.0124 0.165 2.50 0.0125
Year87 0.121 1.835 0.0665 0.121 1.83 0.0667
P-ratio -0.677E-3 -1.067 0.286 -0.682E-3 -1.077 0.281
Gov1 0.856 2.893 0.00381 0.691 6.684 0.000
Gov2 0.492 1.729 0.0839 0.323 4.747 0.000
Gov3 0.169 0.606 0.544
Sizel 0.408 5.176 0.000 0.410 5.242 0.000
Size2 0.161 2.161 0.0307 0.163 2.187 0.000
Trdl 0.933 6.517 0.000 0.927 6.497 0.000
Trd2 0.417 6.395 0.000 0.414 6.374 0.000
Trd3 0.398 5.537 0.000 0.398 5.545 0.000
Refl -0.190E-01 -0.301 0.763
Ref2 -0.152 -1.461 0.144 -0.142 -1.505 0.132
n = 1790 z5% = 1.55 n = 1790 Z5% = 1.55
Regression 3 Regression 4
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio Prob(t > x) Coefficient t-ratio Prob(t > x)
One -0.380 -1.315 0.188 -0.221 -2.610 0.009
Year86 0.166 2.499 0.0125 0.166 2.50 0.0125
Year87 0.125 1.896 0.0580 0.125 1.896 0.0580
P-ratio
Gov1 0.860 2.906 0.00366 0.690 6.678 0.000
Gov2 0.496 1.742 0.0814 0.322 4.738 0.000
Gov3 0.174 0.623 0.533
Sizel 0.403 5.115 0.000 0.404 5.182 0.000
Size2 0.156 2.086 0.0370 0.157 2.112 0.0347
Trd1 0.931 6.502 0.000 0.925 6.482 0.000
Trd2 0.417 6.400 0.000 0.415 6.377 0.000
Trd3 0.396 5.520 0.000 0.397 5.528 0.000
Refl -0.190E-1 -0.300 0.764
Ref2 -0.148 -1.419 0.156 -0.137 -1.460 0.144
n = 1790 z5% = 1.55 n = 1790 25% = 1.55
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level governments have more political considerations and treasure more about con-
trolling over cheap output, while lower level firms care more about fiscal revenue.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence on this.
" The Size Effect Similar to the control effect, the regressions domonstrate that
larger firms tend to have higher quota. Part of the reason is that larger firms are
usually controlled by higher level of governments.
" The Industry Effect The mining industry has the highest quota. This is because
prices of their output influence all products and the government's controlling their
output is the most important to curb inflation. To the contrary, having the low-
est quota is the heavy industry (the default case), which faces a buyers' market
due to many years of over-investment. Therefore, the government is not keen in
controlling its output at all.
" The Manager Contracting Effect The coefficient on Ref 2 says that when the firm
is contracted out to the manager, its quota is low. I interpret this as the bargaining
power effect. The fact that a manager is able to takeover a firm indicates the the
manager is already in a good position to bargain with the bureaucrat. Thus, from
the proposition 1 or 2, the quota is low.
Besides the determination of the quota, another very important issue is to estimate
the magnitude of the rent at stake in the government/enterprise negotiation. The size
of the rent directly determines how much effort the manager should devote to dealing
with the government bureaucrat instead of enhancing efficiency internally. A natural
measure of the impact of rent is obtained by comparing the rent with the firm's total
gross (before tax) profit. That is, A. Recall that
no= sr,,, + R.
Therefore the ratio measures the proportion of the firm's final profit generated by (or
lost to) the government. Similarly, another measure is -- which catches the magnitude
of the firm's rent relative to the firm's market profit.
As a first step, it is interesting to look at some descriptive statistics of -.. Note
that the rent R can be either positive or negative. Table 6 gives the mean and standard
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Table 6: The Mean and Standard Deviation of the Rent/Profit Ratio | ;} |
Case Type (no. of cases) Mean St. Dev. Max.
R= 0 (n=376) 0 0 0
R $ 0(n=609) 1.665 4.335 46.374
deviation of I $. The first thing to note is the sheer magnitude of the rent/profit ratio.
From table 6, the average of the I - - | for firms with non-zero rents is 1.665. That
is, the government's manipulation of quota generated rents which on average are much
bigger than the final profit of the firm. Also, these rents are in general of the opposite
sign of the market profit. In addition, note the large standard deviation 4.335, which
indicates that there were large variations in the rent/profit ratio.
Table 7 takes another look at the magnitude of the rent by calculating the average
rent/market-profit ratio| I-| and classifying it by by various categories of firms. R > 0
indicates rent earning firms; R < 0 the rent losers. A clear pattern emerges from table
7. That is, the government's manipulation of the quota actually amounts to equalizing
the final profits. Specifically, rent-losing firms are almost all market-profit makers (only
3 out 241 cases - less than 1.5% - are not). On the other hand, most of the market-
profit losers enjoy positive rent provided by the government (3 out of (97+3) cases -
less than 3% - did not). A second observation from table 7 is the sheer magnitude
of rent enjoyed by the profit losers, as measured by the ratio | -j-. It implies how
important the rent is for the rent-earners and thus how much effort the managers must
have put in.
To summarize the findings on the size of the rent, it is fair to say that rent-seeking
is very important for the Chinese SOE's after the reform. This is simply because in the
bargaining with the government on the contract, a huge amount of rent is at stake for
the enterprise.
In order to further study the distribution of the rent, I ran a group of regressions
by treating the rent/total-profit ratio (A) as the dependent variable. The independent
variables are the market/plan price ratio, output quota, and a group of dummy variables
of the attributes of the firm. The regression results are listed in table 8. Regression 1
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Table 7: The Mean and Standard Deviation of the Rent/Market-Profit Ratio I-
R (no. of cases) r,,m (no. of cases) Mean St. Dev.
R > 0 lrm > 0 (n=278) 2.67 13.11
(n=375)
WM < 0 (n=97) 5.74 16.61
R < 0 rm > 0 (n=238) 0.413 0.295
(n=241)
W. 0 (n=3) 0.751 1.08
has the most complete regressors. Regression 2 and 3 take out the insignificant output
quota, which is suspected to be highly collinear with the dummies, given the outcome
of previous regressions. Regression 3 further drops several insignificant dummies from
regression 2.
The regressions reveal a simple pattern: none of the regressors are significant, except
for the 1986 dummy and the market/planed ratio (P-ratio). The implication is that
various attributes of the firm are not predictive of the size of the rent the firm obtains.
It suggests that the bargaining power of the firm, which determines the size of the rent,
is not associated with the types of the firm. Rather, it is possible for managers of any
types of firms to grab a large rent. In other words, the rent is seekable. As for the
negative coefficient on P-ratio, it simply means that firms facing a high market/plan
price ratio lose the most rent. The reason is that given the same quota, the larger the
difference between the planned price and the market price, the firm loses more rent.
Overall, the findings on the quota negotiation can be summarized as follows. First,
the allocation of the quota is generally consistent with a bargaining theory. This gives us
more confidence on the assumption that government desires both profit and output.(As
argued by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993.) Second, the large size of the rent suggests
that it is highly necessary for the manager to devote a great effort in dealing with
bureaucrats. Finally, the rent is found to be independent of the enterprise type and this
Table 8: Regression Analysis of the Rent/Profit Ratio
Regression 1 Regression2 Regression 3
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
One 3.948 3.696 3.912 3.699 3.899 3.832
Year86 -0.565 -2.374 -0.551 -2.372 -0.512 -2.534
Year87 -0.0880 -0.375 -0.0796 -0.346
P-ratio -2.289 -22.198 -2.290 -22.426 -2.288 -22.487
Quota 0.723E-7 1.624
GovI -1.032 -0.935 -1.027 -0.939 -0.998 -0.931
Gov2 -0.975 -0.929 -0.975 -0.939 -0.954 -0.941
Gov3 -0.957 -0.929 -0.942 -0.922 -0.936 -0.941
Sizel 0.115 0.411 0.104 0.381
Size2 -0.280 -1.115 -0.261 -1.037 -0.321 -1.675
Trdl 0.0611 0.0935 0.0584 0.0903
Trd2 -0.237 -1.017 -0.220 -0.972 -0.239 -1.094
Trd3 -0.237 -0.917 -0.186 -0.728 -0.187 -0.739
Ref1 0.274 1.204 0.292 1.309 0.325 1.654
Ref2 -0.0723 -0.207 -0.0730 -0.214
n = 984 Adj.R2 = 0.342 t5% = 1.645 Adj.R2 = 0.340 t5% = 1.645 Adj.R 2= 0.342 t5% = 1.6
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suggests that the rent is open to managers of all enterprises.
111.3. Ex Post Bargaining - The Problem of the Soft budget Constraint
Er Post bargaining is a situation where the enterprise bargains with the government
for retained profit after the profit is realized. During the reform, typically, the firm signs
a contract with the state regarding the profit sharing rule. However, such contracts are
hardly expected to be binding, especially when the firm makes a negative total profit. In
such cases, the firm can always expect to get a favorable treatment from the government.
It is the so-called soft budget constraint.
The following analyses focus on the profit losers. A tricky issue is the profit figure,
which has to be carefully calculated, since the accounting profit many times already
includes government subsidies. The gross profit figure, which I will use, is recalculated
by taking all production costs from the sales revenue. Not counted as a cost item
are contributions to the firm's welfare funds, which is for extra-bonus and perks and
therefore should be regarded as part of the retained profit.
According to the re-constructed gross profit, Table 9 lists the percentage of profit-
losers among all firms for each year in the sample. Also listed are the percentage of
profit losers according to the reported accounting profit. One obvious observation is
that the reported account profit losing rate is much lower than the re-calculated rate.
This is simply because a lot subsidies are already provided before the firm ever reports
losing profit. A second observation is thht even the re-calculated profit losing rate is
consistently lower than 20%, while the widely accepted profit losing rate in China is 30%.
Sample selection bias is the major reason for this. It is much easier to collect data from
profit making firms than profit losing firms and therefore the sample definitely consists
of disproportionately more profit making "good" firms.
Who are the profit losers? One useful classification is by dividing them into chronic
losers and random losers. Chronic profit losers may be caused by distorting governmental
policies and are not necessarily due to mis-management. They are corresponding to the
ex ante soft budget constraint discussed in secton II. Random profit losers are either
due to mis-management of the manager or just because of bad luck. Table 10 gives the
proportion of firms that encountered negative profit for one year, two year, and three
Table 9: Sample Percentage of Profit Losers




Table 10: The Distribution of the Number of Years in Red
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
55.07% 34.29% 9.64%
years from 1986 to 1988, respectively. The table reveals that distribution of years of
losing profit is rather skewed towards the one year end. That means that most of the
firms in the sample appears to be random profit losers. Of course, sample bias may have
caused this pattern.
Who are the most likely profit losers? In other words, what are the characteristics
of the profit losing firms? In order to answer these questions, a Probit analysis is
provided in table 11. Each firm in each year is one observation point. 0 is assigned
to profit makers and 1 is assigned to profit losers. The explanatory variables are the
firm dummies as well as Quota, which is the output quota ratio (planned output to total
output). The regression reveals several interesting patterns. Quota has a very significant
and positive coefficient. This means that firms facing high quotas are likely to be in red.
According to the model, a high quota means the government's desire for output is more
or less imposed onto the firm and therefore a negative profit is not surprising at all.
Similarly, the control dummies (Covl, Gov2, and Gov3) essentially explains the same
intuition. A surprise is that the size effect per se, as revealed by the size dummies,
is negative. That is, given other things being equal, large firms are less likely to be
in red. One possible explanation is that for these firms, many favorable treatments
are already incorporated before the accounting profit is calculated, such as low interest
loans. Finally, the regression shows that industry type matters. Firms in mining and
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Table 11: Probit Analysis of Likelihood of Firms in Red
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio
One -0.752 -2.374 -0.168
Year86 -0.218 -2.391 -0.0488
Year87 -0.231 -2.535 -0.0517
Quota 0.281 3.050 0.0629
Govi 0.353 1.084 0.0789
Gov2 0.103 0.331 0.0231
Gov3 0.266 0.894 0.0596
Sizel -0.516 -4.862 -0.115
Size2 -0.311 -3.341 -0.0696
Trdl 0.480 2.974 0.107
Trd2 0.388 -4.215 -0.0868
Trd3 -0.323 -3.112 -0.0721
Ref1 -0.519E-02 -0.0571 -0.00116
Ref2 -0.187 -1.983 -0.0419
n = 1747 %Pred = 84 zs% = 1.55
where, IrR;t is the retained profit of the firm i in year t; 7r;1 is the firm's gross profit and
e,1 is the random error which is omitted by the model. Thus, the higher the #, the more
accountable the firm is for its loses.
In measuring the accountability for financial loses, I find it useful to distinguish
random profit losers from chronic ones. Table 12 gives the results from such analyses
for firms that have run loses for less than two years from 1986 to 1988. Table 13 lists
those for firms that have run loses for all three years.
Measured by the accountability for losses, the budget constraint is softer for the
random profit losers than for the chronic ones. For the random losers, the average
correlation between the retained profit and the gross profit is actually -10.9% (regression
2). That means the big one-time losers can expect to get more positive retained profit
than the small one-time losers. A likely explanation is that with these random profit
losers, the government has less accurate information as of the reason of the profit loss.
Therefore the firm can always argue for the case that they have really tried very hard
and the profit loss is due to bad luck. The big losers can even make a bigger case out of
this than the small ones. This explanation is backed by the size effect in the regression
(Sizel and Size2): medium size and to some extent large size firms faced softer budget
constraint. Also, very interestingly, reform actually implies more subsidies (as indicated
by the coefficients of Ref1 and Ref2). This is perhaps due to the fact that firms under
special reform programs enjoy higher bargaining power than others.
As for the chronic losers, Table 13 reveals that their retained profit is in general inde-
pendent of the negative profit - the correlation coeffient is statistically indistinguishable
from 0. This result for the chronic losers is not surprising, since their losing profit is
often due to exogenous reasons and in many times fully expected by all, as described by
Corollary 1. In addition, Table 13 finds no particular type of firm enjoyed better treat-
ment, except for firms undergoing special reform measures. Similar intuitions discussed
in the random profit losing are applicable here.
Overall, the findings on the soft-budget constraint can be summarized that the soft
budget constraint is still very prevalent after the reform. Profit losing is to a large extent
an outcome of government intervention, such as imposing a high quota. Random profit
losers enjoy better treatment from the government than the chronic one, partly due to
raw material industry (TRD1) are most likely to be in red while firms in light industry
(TRD2) or chemical industry (TRD3) are least likely to be in red. Explanations similar
to those for the quota distribution apply here.
The next question is about the severity of the so-called soft budget constraint. The
mere fact that in China no state owned firm is allowed to bankrupt is a proof of the
existence of the soft budget constraint. However, further analysis is needed in order to
measure the extent of the problem. One possible index of the softness of the budget
constraint is the correlation between the firm's retained profit and the firm's total gross
profit. Specifically, one can run the following regression across profit-losing firms of
various years:
IrRit = Ci + ?#it + fet,
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Table 12: Measuring Budget Softness For Random Profit Losers
Regression 1 Regression 2
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
One 87.180 0.334 -52.865 -0.412
Year86 25.521 0.590 70.275 1.781
Year87 13.690 0.151 95.893 2.387
Govi 78.538 0.283 108.012 0.734
Gov2 -77.863 -0.298 141.109 1.101
Gov3 -32.374 -0.206 1.930 0.0161
Sizel 112.209 1.894 116.838 2.229
Size2 -18.706 -0.473 32.193 0.824
Thdl -32.374 -0.251 -101.278 -1.122
Trd2 -2.329 0.0573 -48.522 -1.238
Trd3 -23.061 0.4660 3.816 0.0809
Refl. -14.537 -0.333 15.983 0.391
Ref2 0.820 0.0194 53.858 1.320
X0.432 0.537 -0.109 -5.115
w * Year86 -0.167 -2.032
7r * YeaT87 -0.223 -3.307
it * Goul -0.0268 -0.033
it * Gov2 -0.464 -0.572wr * Gov3 -0.0550 -0.0683
ir*Sizel -0.204 -1.708
wr * Size2 -0.363 -3.576
i * Trdl 0.171 0.0152
i* Trd2 0.109 1.931
it * Trd3 0.0745 0.978
x * Ref 1 -0.0702 -1.220
it * Ref 2 -0.232 -3.459
______Adj.R
2
=0.420 15%(172) = 1.645 Adj.R 2=0.262 t%(184) = 1.645
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Table 13: Measuring Budget Softness For Chronic Profit Losers
Regression 1 Regression 2
Regressor Coefficient t-ratio Coefficiet t-ratio
One -12.546 -0.212 -23.292 -0.425
Year86 1.011 0.0225 42.647 1.035
Year87 32.096 0.715 51.691 1.260
Govi 51.949 0.506 -19.606 -0.295
Gov2 -39.241 -0.345 -85.558 -1.014
Gov3
Sizel 85.306 1.416 165.422 3.223
Size2 57.637 0.805 57.063 0.995
Trdl 20.758 0.252 15.355 0.235
Trd2 40.117 0.401 8.059 0.103
Trd3 21.992 0.219 -27.930 -0.436
Refi -43.109 -0.866 -9.556 -0.233
Ref2 75.641 0.996 48.130 0.794
X0.0731 0.709 0.4409E-2 0.4207r * Year86 -0.0438 -1.457
7r * Year87 -0.0499 -1.64
7r *Govl -0.129 -0.362
it *Gov2 0.115 -0.317
it * Gov3
7r * Sizel -0.0936 -0.988
7r * Size2 -0.948E-3 -0.783E-2
7r *T rd l -0.0731 -0.202
itr*Trd2 0.232 0.308
it *Trd3 0.0613 0.172
i * Refl1 -0.115 -1.827
i * Re f2 0.912E-2 0.127
Adj.R 2=0.463 t5%(56) = 1.676 Adj.R 2=0.224 t5%(67) = 1.671
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their informational advantage. (As illustrated by Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990.) seem to be unavoidable.
IV. Conclusions
The paper examines the response of the Chinese state owned enterprises with special
attention to the interactions between the government and the enterprise. The purpose
is to offer an evaluation of the Chinese gradualist approach to enterprise reform, which
has attracted a great amount of attention and is sometimes touted as an alternative to
privatization.
The study reaches three general conclusions. First, rent seeking, which takes the
form of the firm's bargaining with the government over production quotas, accounts
for a large portion of the firm's profit. During the process, the government takes the
opportunity to impose its own objective onto the enterprise. This implies that firm
managers have to divert a large proportion of their energy dealing with the bureaucrats
instead of improving the firm's productive efficiency. Second, despite the soft budget
constraint, Chinese firms have strong incentives to maximize profit when making static
production decisions after the contract is negotiated. This is a desirable effect of the
reform and perhaps accounted for the documented productivity improvement. Third,
the problem of the soft budget constraint, in the forms of subsidizing both chronic and
random (occasional) profit losers, is still prevalent and is not mitigated after the reform.
This implies that the investment decision of the firm is still severely distorted.
The overall implication of the conclusions is clear. The remaining problems with
the Chinese SOE's are excessive rent seeking and the soft budget constraint. These
are mere symptoms instead of the cause. The cause is deeply rooted in the nature of
the entangled relationship between the government and the enterprise. The reform is
incomplete in re-defining the government-enterprise relation. In order to completely
resolve these problems, some types of substantial reform which amounts to re-defining
the government-enterprise relations and building a new corporate governance structure
APPENDIX
Al. Proof of Proposition 1
The objective function of the firm is the expected retained profit:
E(WR) = E[p(wo + e)|j e> -ro][1 - F(-wo)]+ E[('yro + e) Ic -wo]F(-ro)
L (, o + ,)fs)ds + (wo + a)f,(s)ds.
Thus,
dE(irn) _ o0-WO
dER ,,f,(s)dsa+J 7f,(a)du +#P(wo - wo)f,(-wo) + 7(wo - o)f.(-ro)
0  -,
= j 1 f,(a)da+ E 1 f,(a)da> 0.
Therefore, maximizing E(WR) is equivalent to maximizing xo. Consequently, it is easy to check
that (1, y) maximizes io.
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
A2.1. Step 1
Let's show that the optimal allocation xo must maximize
AE[w(zo)]+ (1 - A)f(z(zo)).
Suppose not. There exists z' such that
AE[ir(z')]J+ (1 - A)f(z(z')) > AE[w(zo)]J+ (1- Af(x(zo)).
Let the old transfer which goes with zo be to. Define 9, such that
E[R(z')]J+ = E[WR(zo)]+ to,
i.e., the firm is indifferent between the package z', t and zo, to. Let's calculate the new payoff
to the government:
A[E[WG(z')) - t']+ (1 - A)/(z(z')) = A[E(w(z')] - E(xR(z') - t']+ (1 - A)f(z(z'))
= A[E(w(z')]+(1-A)f(z(z'))-A[E[iR(z')]+t']> A[E((zo)]+(1-A)f(z(zo))-A[E[lR(zo)]+t]
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= A[E(w(zo)] + (1 - A)f(z(zo)) - A[E[fr(zo)]+ to]= A[E(wo(zo) - to] + (1- A)f((zo)).
Therefore, the package z', t' is also superior to :o, to for the government. This is a contradiction
to the assumption.
A2.2. Step 2
I will show that there are only two possible optimal zo which maximize AE[f(zo)]+ (1 -
A)f(x(xo)). Define W(zo) = AE[f(zo)] + (1 - A)f(z(zo)). Notice that
W'(zo) = AE'[f(zo)]+ (1 - A)f'(z(zo)) = Ai'o(zo) + (1 - A)f'(z(zo))-
There are two cases: zo < zj and zo > :i, where :j is defined in Proposition 1, which says
that in the first case z(zo) = zi and To = lm(z1) + (k - 1)Wm(zo). Thus, in the first case,
W'(zo) = A(k - 1)W'm(zo) < 0
since k < 1 by assumption. In this case, the optimal zo is 0.
In the second case, z(zo) = zo and To = im(zo) + (k - 1)wm(zo) = kwm(zi). Thus,
W'(zo) = Akw'm(zo) + (1 - A)f'(zo).
Notice that by the definition of xi, the first term is negative. The second term is always
positive. The second order derivative is
W"(zo) = Akf"(zo) + (1 - A)f"(zo) < 0
according to the general assumption on f(.). Thus, an optimal will be achieved by a point of
zo > :i. Define this to be 12.
In order to determine which of the two 0 and z2 is optimal, we have
W(0) = Axm(zi),
since when zo < zi, the firm chooses zi; and
W(z2)= Akim(z 2 ) + (1 - A)f(z2 ).
Comparing these two expressions while noticing that Tm(zi) > rm(z2) and 0 < f(x 2), it is
hard to decide which is better a priori. Thus, the statements in propositions are verified.
A2.3. Step s
To show that the equilibrium zo is non-increasing in A, it is enough to show that -
2 (E) A<
0. This is easy to see, since
02 W(zo)
Ozo2(z = ki'm(zo) + -f'(zo) < 0,
Similarly, to show that z2 is non-increasing in k, one can check that <- 0, when
zo > zj. In this case, we have
03W(:o) = Aw,(zo) < 0.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
First of all, z3 has to be defined. Consider the case 6 = 0. As will be shown in A3.1, zo in
this case is the largest. The solution of zo now maximizes
G = AE(wo) + (1- A)f(z).
It can be easily checked that G"(zo) < 0 if zo > zi. Z3 is defined as the solution to the first
order condition
AE' (W) + (1- A)fi(x) = 0.
In order to show that z3 z2, by the definition of:z2 in A2, it suffices to show that I E'(wa)|1<|
E'(w)|I=| I' j, since f'(xo) decreases with zo. This is can be easily verified, as
I E'(wG) 1= [L*(1 - f)f 5(s)ds + (1 -7)f 5(s)ds)I r'(:o)1<1 '(zo)I-
JA3.1. 
0
Since everything is differentiable, a discrete case suffices here. Take 0 Si,h os 1, and
suppose that 61 < 62. Let F1 and GI be the payoff to the firm and the government associated
with Si, respectively. Let F2 and G2 be those associated with 62. Since (F;,CG) is the argument
which maximizes (F - F*)ai(G - G*)
1-4 (i = 1 or 2), it must be that neither one Pareto
dominates the other.
Suppose that Fi > F and Ci < 02. I will show that this is impossible. From the
optimization condition, we have
and
(al) can be re-writ
and (a2) becomes
(F1 - F*)a (i - *)1-'i > (P2 - F')''(02 
- G*)t~a,
(Fi - F*)h(Gi - G*)-a, <(F2 - F*)a'(G 2 -
ten as









when zo zm, and
2W(zo) = kz'm(zo) > 0,OzoBA
Combining (a3) with (a4) gives:





Since 62 > 61, (a5) implies that
F - F < G1-G*
which directly contracts the assumption that F1 > F2 and GI < Gs. Thus, the only possibility
is that F1 <F2 and G1 > G2.
We thus proved that S5 > 0. In order to prove that 1  0, we only need to show that
Sa < 0, which is easily verified in the following. Notice that
8F 9E(i) dE(irR) &Wo
8zo 8o ~dir0 8z
From appendix Al, w e know that dEd on)> 0. As for ", it is
(k - l)x',,(zo) < 0_
when x0 < z ; or
kir,,(zo) < 0
when zo > x I. Therefore, ego< 0
One corollary of this proof comes handy in later proofs. The first order condition for ro is:
6 w (r)o+1-6 [ r)o+(-A ~~ ) .(6
E(lrR) - F AE(ir0 ) + (1 - A)f (z) GA'Wo±( - )() =.(6
Define the left-hand-side as FOC, then take derivative on both sides of (a6i) with respect to 6,
we have: OFOC OFOC 8zo
86 +& -06
or ~~E'(1rR)z-0  AE'(z 0),,. + (1 - A) fe(z) +OFOC 8zo=0. a7
E(lrR) - P* AE(rG) + (1 - A)f (z) - G" (a?)8
Notice that E'(lrR):o < 0 and therefore from the first order condition (a6)
AE'(irc)50 + (1 - A)f'(xo) > 0.
Combined with (a7) and the fact that < 0, the above implies that
OOC <0. (a8)
This inequality will be used time and again in later proofs.
A3.2 ~ > 0
By the first order condition (a6i), taking derivative on both sides with respect to A, we have
(G_ -G,)2 {[E'(wc)=o - f 0(z)J(G(xo) - G) - !AE'(WGc):o + (1 - AVf', 3()1(E(wGc) - f (X)
+ FC z =0.(a9)
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From the proof in A3.1, we know that < 0. We only need to prove the numerator of
the first term in the above expression is negative. We know from A3.1 that AE'(wo) + (1 -
A) flo(x) > 0. Also, E'(wo),,, = E(1r)ox1' < 0. Therefore, In the case that E(WG) > f (z),
we can conclude that ' >- 0.
In the case that E(WG) < f(z), which implies that f (z) > GC (otherwise AE(wo) + (1 -
A) f(z) < G* ). Let's concentrate on the numerator of the first term of (a9). Its derivative
with respect to 20 is:
[E"(irc) - f~f()[AE(wG) + (1 - A)f (z) - G*J + (E'(ir~j) - f *(x))[A'ro) + (1 - A)fL0(z)j
-[E'(lrG) - fs0(z)J[AE'(zo) + (1 - A)f~o(z)J - [E(wo) - f (z)J[AE"(iro) + (1 - AWf (W
_ [E"(lrG) - f~o(z)J[AE(iro) + (1 - A)f (z) - GJ1- [E(WG) - f (z)IAE"(WG) + (1 - W.".(z)J
_ [f (a) - GJ]E"(iro) - [Efro) - G*]ff(x) < [f(z) - G*iE"(iro) - [f (z) - G*If o(z)
= [f (z) - GJ][E"(irc) - f.(z)J < 0.
Thus, the numerator decreases with 20. The numerator is negative when E(WG) >- f(z)
and therefore, it must be also be negative when EfrG) < f(z) since in the later case 20 is
bigger.
Thus, the desired result is proved in all cases.
AS.3. The Sign of P&
The partial derivative of FOC with respect to k is:
OFOC _ 6
8k = E(WR) - FP]2 (E"(1R),,k[E(WR) -F] - E'(WR)zeE'(WR)kJ}16+A -A z-G A"x~o[E')+( )f( ) -G1
[AE'(irc)Nb + (1 - A)1i.(z)J[AEt(wGhJ }. (a9)
It is easy to show that
9(7Ro = [J 3 P(ad)ds + j:0 f, (a)daj x'' (zo);
+00 -N
"(crk= [J 0(1 - I)Id(a)da+ J (1 - 7)f1(u)dsJi,(xo);
E'(irR)k = (If fif(a)da + f 'f(a)eJw,(zo);
and
E(G = [j+0 (1 - Qf3)1(a)da +L 1 ) x(~s m(z0).
Meanwhile, by using the first order condition(afl), equation (a9) can be re-orgainized into
the following:
OFOC 6 "x~o A(1 - 6) E(r~o
Ok E(WR) - j? "(R* 0  AE(wa) + (1 - A)f (z) -G
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.-. '(z5)- { E'(R)k(a10)
E(WR) - F* E(wa) - F* AE(Wa) + (1- A)f(z) - G*
Plugging the expressions of the partial derivatives with respect to k into (a10), we have
OFOC = {E Fi- fie(s)dea+ f(a)ds
ir A(1- ) GI+0(1 - )f,(s)ds + J (1 - 7)f(s)ds] }i'(zo)Aw)+ (1 - A)f(:) - G*
6 f_#. f,(a)ds + f. "f,(s)ds
E(ir) - F* E(w) - F*
f_-(1 -f)f,(s)ds+ f~,0(1 -7)f,(o)ds ) } ,,(Zo).
AE(ia) + (1 - A)f(z) - G*
When A is close to 0, the second large term is positive (E'(za),, < 0); furthermore when
zo < z , '. > 0. In other situations, it is possible that % < 0.
A3.4 5% 1<O and *.>>-0
It suffices to check that <_ 0. It is
OFOC 8 g,,)=OF* [E(wa) - F*) *
which is obviously non-positive. The similar exercise can be done with G*.
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